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POST-COLONIALISM AND THE QUESTION OF NATION-
STATE VIOLENCE.
E. SAN JUAN, JR.'
It has become axiomatic for post-modernist thinkers to condemn the
nation and its corollary terms, "nationalism" and "nation-state," as the
classic evils of modem industrial society. The nation-state, its reality if
not its concept, has become a kind of malignant paradox, if not a sinister
conundrum. It is often linked to violence and the terror of "ethnic clean-
sing." Despite this, the United Nations and the interstate system still
function as seemingly viable institutions of everyday life. How do we
explain this development?
Let us review the inventory of charges made against the nation-state.
Typically described in normative terms as a vital necessity of modem
life, the nation-state has employed violence to accomplish questionable
ends. Its disciplinary apparatus is indicted for committing unprecedented
barbarism. Examples of disasters brought about by the nation-state are
the extermination of indigenous peoples in colonized territories by "civi-
lizing" nations, the Nazi genocidal "holocaust" of Jews, and most re-
cently the "ethnic cleansing" in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, East
Timor, and so on. Following Elie Kedourie, Partha Chatterjee, and oth-
ers, including Alfred Cobban, I believe that the Eurocentric theory of
nationalism has proved one of the most potent agencies of destruction in
the modem world.2 In certain cases, nationalism mobilized by states
competing against other states has become synonymous with totalitarian-
ism and fascism. Charles Tilly, Michael Howard, and other historians
concur in the opinion that war and the military machine are principal
determinants in the shaping of nation states.3 In The Nation-State and
Violence, Anthony Giddens defines nationalism as "the cultural sensibil-
ity of sovereignty" (note the fusion of culture and politics) that unleashes
administrative power within a clearly demarcated territory, "the bounded
nation-state."4 Although it is allegedly becoming obsolete under the pres-
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sure of globalization,5 the nation-state is considered by "legal modern-
6ists" as the prime source of violence against citizens and entire peoples.
Post-modernist critiques of the nation (often sutured with the coloni-
alist/imperialist state) locate the evil in its ideological nature. This pri-
marily concerns the nation as the source of identity for modern individu-
als via citizenship or national belonging, converting natal filiation (kin-
ship) into political affiliation. Identity implies definition by negation,
inclusion based on exclusion underwritten by a positivist logic of repre-
sentation.7 But these critiques seem to forget that the nation is a creation
of the modern capitalist state, that is, a historical artifice or invention.
It is a truism that nation, and its corollary problematic, nationalism,
presupposes the imperative of hierarchization and asymmetry of power
in a political economy of commodity-exchange. Founded on socially
constructed myths or traditions, the nation is posited by its proponents as
a normal state of affairs used to legitimize the control and domination of
one group over others. Such ideology has to be deconstructed and ex-
posed as contingent on the changing grid of social relations. Post-
colonial theory claims to expose the artificial and arbitrary nature of the
nation: "This myth of nationhood, masked by ideology, perpetuates na-
tionalism, in which specific identifiers are employed to create exclusive
and homogeneous conceptions of national traditions."8 Such signifiers of
homogeneity not only fail to represent the diversity of the actual "nation"
but also serve to impose the interests of a section of the community as
the general interest. But this is not all. In the effort to make this univer-
salizing intent prevail, the instrumentalities of state power-the military
and police, religious and educational institutions, judiciary and legal ap-
paratuses-are deployed. Hence, from this orthodox post-colonial per-
spective, the nation-state and its ideology of nationalism are alleged to
have become the chief source of violence and conflict since the French
Revolution.
Mainstream social science regards violence as a species of force,
which violates, breaks, or destroys a normative state of affairs. It is coer-
cion tout court. Violence is often used to designate power devoid of le-
gitimacy or legally sanctioned authority. Should violence as an expres-
sion of physical force always be justified by political reason in order to
be meaningful and therefore acceptable? If such a force is used by a
state, an inherited political organ legitimized by "the people" or "the
5. See generally SASKIA SASSEN, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (1998).
6. See generally Nathaniel Berman, Modernism, Nationalism and Rhetoric of
Reconstruction, in AFrER IDENTITY: A READER IN LAW AND CULTURE (Dan Danielson & Karen
Engle eds. 1995).
7. See generally ETIENNE BALIBAR & IMMANUEL WAI.ERSTIEN, RACE, NATION, CLASS:
AMBIGUOUS IDENTITIES (1991).
8. BELL ASHCROFr Er AL, KEY CONCEPTS IN POST COLONIAL STUDIES 150 (1998).
[Vol. 78:4
POST-COLONIALISM
nation," should we not distinguish between state-defined purposes and in
what specific way nationalism or nation-making identity is involved in
those state actions? State violence and assertion of national identity need
not be automatically conflated so as to implicate nationalism in all
class/state actions in every historical period. Such a move would be an
absolutist censure of violence bereft of intentionality. In order words,
violence would be construed as merely physical force akin to tidal
waves, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, and so on.
Violence, in my view, signifies a political force that demands dialec-
tical triangulation in order to grasp how nation and state are implicated in
it. A historical-materialist historicization of this phenomenon is needed
to determine the complicity of individual states and nations in specific
outbreaks of violence. But post- colonialists like Homi Bhabha resort to a
questionable use of the discursive performativity of language to ascribe a
semiotic indeterminacy to the nation, reducing it to a formula of hybrid-
ity and liminality of the multifarious narratives of nations/peoples.9 His-
tory is reduced to the ambiguities of culture and the play of textualities,
ruling out critique and political intervention.
In this light, what makes the post-colonialist argument flawed be-
comes clear in the fallacies of its non-sequitur reasoning. It is perhaps
easy to expose the contingent nature of the nation once its historical con-
dition of possibility is pointed out. But it is more difficult to contend that
once its socially contrived scaffolding is revealed, the nation-state and its
capacity to mobilize and apply the means of violence can be restricted if
not curtailed.
We can pose this question at this point: Can one seriously claim that
once the British state is shown to rest on the myth of the Magna Carta or
the United States government on the covenant of the Founding Fathers to
uphold the interests of every citizen, except of course African slaves and
other non-white peoples, one has undermined the power of the British or
American nation-state? Not that this is an otiose and naive task. Debunk-
ing has been the classic move of those protesting against an unjust status
quo purporting to be the permanent and transcendental condition for eve-
ryone.
But the weapon of criticism, as Marx once said, needs to be rein-
forced by the principled criticism of weapons.' ° If we want to guard
against committing the same absolutism or essentialism of the imperial
nationalists, we need a historicizing strategy of ascertaining how force-
the energy of social collectivities-turns into violence for the creation or
9. See HOMI BHABHA, THE LOCATION OF CULTURE (1994).
10. See KARL MARX, CRITIQUE OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 137 (Annette John &
Joseph O'Malley trans., 1970) "The weapon of criticism certainly cannot replace the criticism of
weapons; material force must be overthrown by material force; but theory, too, becomes a material
force once it seizes the masses."
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destruction of social orders and singular life-forms. Understood as em-
bodying "the pathos of an elemental force," the insurrectionary move-
ments of nationalities have been deemed the source of a vital and pri-
mordial energy that feeds "the legal Modernist composite of primitivism
and experimentalism," a fusion of "radical discontinuity and reciprocal
facilitation.""
The question of the violence of the nation-state thus hinges on the
linkage between the two categories, "nation" and "state." A prior dis-
tinction perhaps needs to be made between "nation" and "society." While
the former "may be ordered, the [latter] orders itself.'' 12 Most historical
accounts remind us that the modem nation-state has a beginning, and
consequently, it is often forgotten, an ending. But the analytic and struc-
tural distinction between the referents of nation (local groups, commu-
nity, domicile or belonging) and state (governance, machinery of sanc-
tioning laws, disciplinary codes, military) is often elided because the
force of nationalism is often conflated with the violence of the state ap-
paratuses, an error compounded by ignoring the social classes involved
in each sphere. This is the lesson of Marx and Lenin's necessary dis-
crimination between oppressor and oppressed nations-a nation that op-
presses another cannot really claim to be free. Often the symptom of this
fundamental error is indexed by the formula of counter-pointing the state
to civil society, obfuscating the symbiosis and synergy between them.
This error may be traced partly to the Hobbesian conflation of state and
society in order to regulate the anarchy of the market and of brutish indi-
vidualism violating civil contracts. 3
It may be useful to recall the metaphysics of the origin of the nation
elaborated in Ernest Renan's 1882 lecture, "What is a nation?"'' 4 This
may be considered one of the originary locus of nationalism conceived as
a primitivist revolt against the centralized authority of modernizing in-
dustrial states. While Renan emphasized a community founded on acts of
sacrifice and their memorialization, this focus does not abolish the fact
that the rise of the merchant bourgeoisie marked the start of the en-
trenchment of national boundaries first drawn in the age of monarchical
absolutism. 5 The establishment of the market coincided with the intro-
duction of taxation, customs, tariffs, etc., underlined by the assertion of
linguistic distinctions among the inhabitants of Europe. Karl Polanyi's
thesis of The Great Transformation urges us to attend to the complexities
in the evolution of the nation-state in the world system of commodity
11. See Berman, supra note 6, at 238.
12. See generally MICHAEL BROWN, THE PRODUCTION OF SOCIETY (1986).
13. See generally BERTELL OILMAN, DIALECTICAL INVESTIGATIONS (1993).
14. Ernest Renan, "Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?" in NATIONALSM (John Hutchinson and
Anthony D. Smith eds., 1994).
15. Id. at 17-18.
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exchange.6 We also need to attend to Ernest Gellner's argument that
cultural and linguistic homogeneity has served from the outset as a func-
tional imperative for states administering a commodity-centered econ-
omy and its class-determining division of social labor.'
7
Post-colonialists subscribe to a post-structuralist hermeneutic of na-
tionalism as a primordial destabilizing force devoid of rationality. While
the formation of the nation-state in the centuries of profound social up-
heavals did not follow an undisturbed linear trajectory, we have only to
remember the untypical origins of the German and Italian nation-states,
not to speak of the national formations of Greece, Turkey, and the colo-
nized peoples; however, that is not enough reason to ascribe an intrinsic
instability and belligerency to the nation as such. States may rise and fall,
as the absolute monarchs and dynasties did, but sentiments and practices
constituting the nation follow another rhythm or temporality not easily
dissolved into the vicissitudes of the modern expansive state. Nor does
this mean that nations, whether in the North or the South, exert a stabiliz-
ing and conservative influence on social movements working for radical
changes in the distribution of power and resources.
In pursuing a historical analysis of violence, we need to avoid col-
lapsing the distinction between the concept of the "nation-state" and "na-
tionalism." Whence originates the will to exclude, the will to dominate?
According to Anthony Giddens, "what makes the 'nation' integral to the
nation-state ... is not the existence of sentiments of nationalism but the
unification of an administrative apparatus over precisely defined territo-
rial boundaries in a complex of other nation-states."'' 8 That is why the rise
of nation-states coincided with wars and the establishment of the military
bureaucratic machine. In this construal, the state refers to the political
institution with centralized authority and monopoly of coercive agencies
coeval with the rise of global capitalism, while nationalism denotes the
diverse configuration of peoples based on the commonality of symbols,
beliefs, traditions, and so on.
In addition, we need to guard against confusing historical periods
and categories. Imagining the nation unified on the basis of secular citi-
zenship and self-representation, as Benedict Anderson has shown, was
only possible when print capitalism arose in conjunction with the expan-
sive state.19 But that in turn was possible when the trading bourgeoisie
developed the means of communication under pressure of competition
and hegemonic exigencies. Moreover, the dissemination of the Bible in
different vernaculars did not translate into a monopoly of violence by the
16. See generally KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION (1957).
17. See generally ERNESTGELLNER, NATIONS AND NATIONAUSM (1983).
18. See GIDDENS, supra note 4, at 172.
19. See generally BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFFLlrONS ON THE
ORIGIN AND SPREAD OF NATIONAUSM (1991).
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national churches. It is obvious that the sense of national belonging,
whether based on clan or tribal customs, language, religion, etc., cer-
tainly has a historical origin and localizing motivation different from the
emergence of the capitalist state as an agency to rally the populace to
serve the needs of the commercial class and the goal of accumulation.
Given the rejection of a materialist analysis of the contradictions in
any social formation, post-colonial critics in particular find themselves
utterly at a loss in making coherent sense when dealing with nationalism.
Representations of the historicity of the nation in the modem period give
way to a Nietzschean will to invent reality as polysemic discourse, a
product of enunciatory and performative acts. Post- colonialism resorts to
a pluralist if not equivocating stance. It sees nationalism as "an extremely
contentious site" in which notions of self-determination and identity col-
lide with notions of domination and exclusion.'o Such oppositions, how-
ever, prove unmanageable indeed if a mechanical idealist perspective is
employed. Such a view in fact leads to an irresolvable muddle in which
nation-states as instruments for the extraction of surplus value (profit)
and "free" exchange of commodities also become violent agencies pre-
venting "free" action in a global marketplace that crosses national
boundaries. Averse to empirical grounding, post-colonialism regards
nationalist ideology as the cause of individual and state competition for
goods and resources in the "free market," with this market conceived as a
creation of ideology. I cite one post-colonial authority that attributes vio-
lence to the nation-state on one hand and liberal disposition to the nation
on the other:
The complex and powerful operation of the idea of a nation can be seen
also in the great twentieth-century phenomenon of global capitalism,
where the "free market" between nations, epitomized in the emergence
of multinational companies, maintains a complex, problematic relation-
ship with the idea of nations as natural and immutable formations based
on shared collective values. Modem nations such as the United States,
with their multi-ethnic composition, require the acceptance of an over-
arching national ideology (Epluribus unum). But global capitalism also
requires that the individual be free to act in an economic realm that
crosses and nullifies these boundaries and identities.2'
It is misleading and foolish then to label the slogan "one in many" as
the U.S. national ideology. Officially, the consensual ideology of the
U.S. is neo-liberal pluralism, or possessive individualism with a prag-
matic orientation. Utilitarian doctrine underwrites an acquisitive, entre-
preneurial individualism that fits perfectly with mass consumerism and
the gospel of the unregulated market. It is within this framework that we
can comprehend how the ruling bourgeoisie of each sovereign state util-




izes nationalist sentiment and the violence of the state apparatuses to
impose their will. Consequently, the belief that the nation-state simulta-
neously prohibits economic freedom and promotes multinational compa-
nies actually occludes the source of political and juridical violence-for
example, the war against Serbia by the NATO (an expedient coalition of
nation-states led by the United States), or the stigmatization of rogue and
"terrorist" states (North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan) by the normative
standards of hegemonic capitalism. The source of political violence, and
I am speaking of that kind where collective energy and intentionality are
involved, is the competitive drive for accumulation in the world market
system where the propertied class is the key actor mobilizing its sym-
bolic capital made up of ethnic loyalties and nationalist imaginaries.
We have now moved from the formalistic definition of the nation as
a historic construct to the nation as a character in the narrative of capital-
ist development and colonialism. What role this protagonist has played
and will play is now the topic of controversy. It is not enough to simply
ascribe to the trading or commercial class the shaping of a new political
form, the nation, to replace city-states, leagues, municipal kingdoms, and
oligarchic republics. Why such "imagined communities" should serve as
a more efficacious political instrument for the hegemonic bloc of prop-
erty-owners, is the question.
One approach to this question is to apply dialectical analysis to the
materialist anatomy of the nation sketched thus far. Historians have de-
scribed the crafting of state power for the new bourgeois nations in
Enlightenment philosophy. Earlier, Jean Bodin and Hugo Grotius theo-
rized the sovereignty of the nation as the pivot of centralized authority
and coercive power.2 The French Revolution posited the "people," the
universal rights of man, as the foundation of legitimacy for the state; the
people as nation, a historical act of constituting the polity, gradually ac-
quires libidinal investment enough to inspire movements of anti-colonial
liberation across national boundaries. Its influence on the U.S. Constitu-
tion as well as on personalities like Sun Yat-Sen, Jose Rizal, and other
"third world" radical democrats has given the principle of popular sover-
eignty a "transnational" if not universal status. Within the system of
nation-states, for Marxists, "recognition of national rights is an essential
condition for international solidarity," in the worldwide fight for social-
ism and communism.N
22. See generally JOHN BOWLE, WESTERN POLITICALTHOUGHT: AN HISTORICAL
INTRODUCTION FROM THE ORIGINS TO ROUSSEAU (1947).
23. See E. SAN JUAN, AFrER POST COLONIALISM: REMAPPiNG THE PHIIPPINES - UNITED
STATES CONFRONTATIONS 104-110 (2000) (discussing Filipino nationalism); J. Blaut, Nationalism
as an Autonomous Force, SCIENCE AND SOCIETY XLVI 1-22 (Spring 1982).
24. MICHAEL LOWRY, FATHERLAND OR MOTHER EARTH? 59 (1991).
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Now this universal principle of people's rights is generally consid-
ered to be the basis of state power for the modem nation, "the empower-
ment, through this bureaucracy, of the interests of the state conceived as
an abstraction rather than as a personal fiefdom."2 A serious mistake
occurs when the nation and its legitimating principle of popular sover-
eignty becomes confused with the state bureaucracy construed either as
an organ transcending the interest of any single class, or as the "execu-
tive committee" of the bourgeoisie. A mechanical, not dialectical,
method underlies this failure to connect the ideology, politics, and eco-
nomics of the bourgeois revolution. This quasi-Hegelian interpretation
posits the popular will of the post-Renaissance nation-states as the motor
of world expansion, of 19th-century colonialism. Instead of the substance
of the "civilizing mission" being informed by the gospel of universal
human rights, according to post-colonial orthodoxy, it is the ideology of
national glory tied to "the unifying signifiers of language and race" that
now impels the colonial enterprise.
So nationalism, the need to superimpose the unifying myths of the
imperial nation-state, is not only generated by the bourgeois agenda of
controlling and regulating the space of its market, but also by the impera-
tive of seizing markets and resources outside territories and peoples. Na-
tionalism is then interpreted by post-colonial theorists as equivalent to
colonialism; the nation is an instrument of imperialist aggrandizement, so
that if newly liberated ex-colonies employ nationalist discourse and prin-
ciples, they will only be replicating the European model whose myths,
sentiments, and traditions justified the violent suppression of "internal
heterogeneities and differences." The decolonizing nation is thus an
oxymoron, a rhetorical if not actual impossibility.
Lacking any historical anchorage, the argument of post-colonial the-
ory generates inconsistencies due to an exorbitant culturalism. Because
they disregard the historical genealogy of the nation-state discussed by
Anderson, Gellner, and Smith among others, post-colonial critics uphold
the sphere of culture as the decisive force in configuring social forma-
tions. It is not that culture is irrelevant in explaining political antago-
nisms; rather, it is erroneous when such antagonisms are translated into
nothing but the tensions of cultural differences. The dogma of cultural
difference (for Charles Taylor, the need and demand for recognition in a
modem politics of identity) becomes then the key to explaining colonial-
25. ASHCROFT, ET AL, supra note 8 at 153.
26. BILL ASHCROFr, GARETH GRIFFITHS, & HELEN TIFFIN, THE POST-COLONIAL STUDIES
READER 152 (1995).
27. See generally BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE
ORIGIN AND SPREAD OF NATIONALISM (1991); ERNEST GELLNER, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM
(1983); ANTHONY SMITh, THEORIES OF NATIONALISM (1971).
[Vol. 78:4
POST-COLONIALISM
ism, racism, and post-colonial society.2 Ambivalence, hybridity, and
interstitial or liminal space become privileged signifiers over against
homogenizing symbols and icons whose "authority of cultural synthesis"
is the target of attack. Ideology and discursive performances serve as the
primary field of analysis over and against "localized materialism" and
vulgar Marxism.
Violence in post-colonial discourse is thus located in ideas and cul-
tural forces that unify, synthesize, or generalize a range of experiences;
such forces suppress difference or negate multiple "others" not subsumed
within totalities such as nation, class, gender, etc. While some culturalist
critics allow for different versions of the historic form of the nation, the
reductive dualism of their thinking manifests a distinct bias for a liberal
framework of analysis: the choice is either a nation based on an exclu-
sionary myth of national unity centered on abstractions such as race, re-
ligion, or ethnic singularity; or a nation upholding plurality and multicul-
turalism (for example, Canada or the United States). This fashionable
vogue of pluralism and culturalism has already been proved inutile in
confronting inequalities of class, gender, and "race." Moreover, it cannot
explain the appeal of nationalism as a means of reconciling the antago-
nistic needs for order and for autonomy in the face of mechanistic bu-
reaucratism and the anarchic market of atomized consumers.29
The most flagrant evidence of the constrained parameters of this cul-
turalist diagnosis of nation/nationalism may be found in its construal of
racist ideology as "the construction and naturalization of an unequal form
of intercultural relations."' If racism occurs only or chiefly on the level
of "intercultural relations," from this constricted optic, the other parts of
a given social formation (political or economic) become superfluous and
marginal. Politics is then reduced to an epiphenomenal manifestation of
discourse and language-games.
A virtuoso application of culturalist contextualism is illustrated by
the legal scholar Rosemary Coombe who defends the right of the Cana-
dian First Nations to claim "ownership" rights to certain cultural prop-
erty.3 Coombe correctly rejects the standard procedure of universalizing
the Lockean concept of property and its rationale, possessive individual-
ism, which underlies the Western idea of authorship and authentic arte-
32facts . She writes: "By representing cultures in the image of the undi-vided possessive individual, we obscure people's historical agency and
28. See generally Charles Taylor, Nationalism and Modernity, in THEORIZING NATIONAUSM
(Ronald Beiner ed., 1999).
29. ANTHONY SMITH, THEORIES OF NATIONALISM (1971).
30. ASHCROFT Er AL, supra note 8 at 46(1998).
31. See generally Rosemary Coombe, The Properties of Culture and the Politics of
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transformations, their internal differences, the productivity of intercul-
tural contact, and the ability of peoples to culturally express their posi-
tion in a wider world." 33 Although Coombe calls attention to structures of
power and the systemic legacies of exclusion, the call remains abstract
and consequently trivializing.3" Above all, it obscures the reality and ef-
fect of material inequities. The post-modernist leitmotif of domination
and exclusion mystifies the operations of corporate capitalism and its
current political suppression of the indigenous struggles for self-
determination. Coombe ignores precisely those "internal differences" and
their contradictory motion that give concrete specificity to the experi-
ences of embattled groups such as the First Nations." Here, ironically,
the post-modernist inflection of the nation evokes the strategy of bour-
geois nationalism to erase class, gender, and other differences ostensibly
in the name of contextual nuances and refined distinctions.
Notwithstanding her partisanship for the oppressed, Coombe con-
demns "cultural nationalism" as an expression of possessive individual-
ism and its idealist metaphysics. 6 But her method of empiricist contextu-
alism contradicts any emancipatory move by the First Nations at self-
determination. It hides the global asymmetry of power, the dynamics of
exploitative production relations, and the hierarchy of states in the geo-
political struggle for world hegemony. We have not transcended identity
politics and the injustice of cultural appropriation because the strategy of
contextualism reproduces the condition by refusing to attack the causes
of class exploitation and racial violence. Despite gestures of repudiating
domination and exclusion, post-modernist contextualism mimics the
moralizing rhetoric of United Nations humanitarianism that cannot, for
the present, move beyond reformism since it continues to operate within
the framework of the transnational corporate globalized market. Such a
framework is never subjected to critical interrogation.
In the fashionable discourse of post-modernists, nation and national-
ism are made complicit with the conduct of Western colonialism and
imperialism. They become anathema to deconstructionists hostile to any
revolutionary project in the "third world" inspired by emancipatory
goals. This is the reason why post-colonial critics have a difficult time
dealing with Fanon and his engagement with decolonizing violence as a
strategic response of subjugated peoples to the inhumane violence of
colonial racism and imperial subjugation. Fanon's conceptualization of a
national culture is the direct antithesis to any culturalist syndrome, in fact
an antidote to it, because he emphasizes the organic integration of cul-
tural action with a systematic program of subverting colonialism: "A






national culture is the whole body of efforts made by a people in the
sphere of thought to describe, justify and praise the action through which
that people has created itself and keeps itself in existence." 37 Discourse
and power are articulated by Fanon in the dialectics of practice inscribed
in the specific historical conditions of their effectivity. Fanon's univer-
salist-critical theory of national liberation proves itself a true "concrete
universal" in that it incorporates via a dialectical sublation the richness of
the particulars embodied in the Algerian revolution.39
Given his historicizing method, Fanon refuses any demarcation of
culture from politics and economics. 40 Liberation is always tied to the
question of property relations, the social division of labor, and the proc-
ess of social reproduction. All of these questions are transvalued by the
imperative of the revolutionary transformation of colonial relations. Op-
posed to Fanon's denunciation of "abstract populism," Edward Said and
Homi Bhabha fetishize an abstract "people" on liminal, borderline
spaces.4' Such recuperation of colonial hegemony via a "third space" or
contrapuntal passage of negotiation reveals the comprador character of
post-colonial theories of translation and cultural exchange. Transcultural
syncretism devised to abolish the nation substitutes for anti-imperialist
revolution a pragmatic modus vivendi of opportunist compromises.
An analogous charge can be leveled at Edward Said's reading of
Fanon's "liberationist" critique. Said locates violence in nationalist
movements (unless it is "critical") since they deny the heterogeneity of
pre-colonial societies by romanticizing the past.42 For Said, liberationist
populism is preferable to nativism and the fanatical cult of "minor differ-
ences. ' 43 Said presents us a hypothetical dilemma: "Fanon's notion was
that unless national consciousness at its moment of success was some-
how changed into social consciousness, the future would not hold libera-
tion but an extension of imperialism."44 Said thus posits a spurious an-
tithesis between the project of national self-determination and a vague
notion of social liberation. For Said, nationalism is always a tool of the
hegemonic oppressor and holds no socially emancipatory potential. 45
Said's answer evacuates Fanon's popular-democratic nationalism of all
social content, postulating an entirely abstract divide between a national-




41. See generally EDWARD SAID, CULTURE AND IMPERIAUSM (1993); Homi Bhabha,




44. Id. at 273.
45. Id.
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ist program and a socially radical one.6 For Said, the violence of anti-
colonial movements becomes symptomatic of a profound colonial mal-
aisei4
National liberation and social justice via class struggle are interde-
pendent. As Leopoldo Marmora observes, "While classes, in order to
become predominant, have to constitute themselves as national classes,
the nation arises from class struggle." 48 The popular-democratic aspira-
tion for self-determination contains both national and social dimensions.
In On Violence, Fanon invoked the ideal of decolonizing freedom as the
legitimizing rationale of mass popular revolution. It is force deployed to
accomplish the political agenda of overthrowing colonial domination and
bourgeois property relations.49 Violence here becomes intelligible as an
expression of subaltern agency and its creative potential. 5° Its meaning is
crystallized in the will of the collective agent, in the movement of seizing
the historical moment to realize the human potential.5 If rights are vio-
lated and the violence of the violator (for example, the state) held re-
sponsible, can the concept of rights be associated with peoples and their
national identities? Or is the authority of the state to exercise violence
derived from the nation/people? Here we need to ascertain the distinction
between the state as an instrument of class interest and the nation/people
as the matrix of sovereignty. The authority of the state as regulative ju-
ridical organ and administrative apparatus with a monopoly of coercive
force derives from its historical origin in enforcing bourgeois rights of
freedom and equality against the absolutist monarchy. National identity
is used by the state to legitimize its actions within a delimited territory
and to insure mobilization and coordination of policy.52 Formally struc-
tured as a Rechststaat, the bourgeois nation-state functions to insure the
self-reproduction of capital through market forces and the continuous
commodification of labor power. Fanon understands that national lib-
eration challenges the global conditions guaranteeing valorization and
realization of capital, conditions in which the internationalization and
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We are thus faced with the notion of structural violence attached to
the bourgeois state as opposed to the intentionalist mode of violence as
an expression of subject/agency such as the collectivity of the people.
Violence is thus inscribed in the dialectic of identity and "Otherness,"
with the bourgeois state's coherence depending on the subordination (if
not consent) of workers and other subalterns.
We can resolve the initial paradox of the nation, a Janus-faced phe-
nomenon, by considering the following historical background.55 The idea
of state-initiated violence (as opposed to communal ethnic-motivated
violence) performs a heuristic role in the task of historicizing any exist-
ing state authority and questioning the peaceful normalcy of the status
quo. The prevailing social order is then exposed as artificial and contin-
gent; what is deemed normal or natural reveals itself as an instrument of
partial interests. But the relative permanence of certain institutional bod-
ies and their effects need to be acknowledged in calculating political
strategies. The long duration of collective and individual memories ex-
erts its influence through the mediation of what Pierre Bourdieu calls
"habitus." 5 We begin to understand that the state's hierarchical structure
is made possible because of the institutionalized violence that privileges
the hegemony (moral and intellectual leadership crafted via negotiating
compromises) of a bloc of classes over competing blocs and their
alternative programs. Hegemony is always underwritten by coercion
(open or covert, subtle or crude) in varying proportions and contingen-
cies. The demarcated territory claimed by a state in rivalry with other
states becomes for Max Weber one major pretext for the state monopoly
of legitimate violence in order to defend private property and promote
the overseas interests of the domestic business class."
Georges Sorel argued for the demystificatory use of violence in Re-
58flections on Violence. Sorel believed that the only way to expose the
illusion of a peaceful and just bourgeois order is to propagate the myth of
the general strike.5 Through strategic, organized violence, the proletariat
is bound to succeed in releasing vast social energies hitherto repressed
and directing them to the project of radical social transformation.!' This
is still confined within the boundaries of the national entity. Open vio-
lence or war purges the body politic of hatred, prejudice, deceptions, and
so on. Proletarian violence destroys bourgeois mystification and the na-
tionalist ethos affiliated with it. Sorel's syndicalist politics of violence
tries to convert force as a means to a political and social end-the proc-
ess of the general strike. This politics of organized mass violence appeals
55. See generally TOM NARIN, THE BREAK-UP OF BRrrAIN (1977).
56. See generally PIERRE BOURDIEU, THE FIE.D OF CULTURAL PRODUCTION (1993).
57. See generally LAWRENCE KRADER, FORMATION OF THE STATE (1968).
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to a utopian vision that displaces the means-ends rationality of bourgeois
society in the fusion of force with pleasure realizable in a just, egalitarian
order.
The classical Marxist view of violence rejects the mechanical calcu-
lation of means-ends that undermines the logic of Blanquist and Sorelian
61conceptions of social change. Marx disavowed utopian socialism in
favor of the overthrow of the bourgeoisie through a combination of vio-
lent and peaceful means. Instrumentalism is subordinated to a narrative
of emancipation from class bondage. The objective of emancipating la-
bor associated with the laboring nation/people requires the exposure of
commodity-fetishism and the ideology of equal exchange of values in the
market. Reification and alienation in social relations account for the
bourgeois state's ascendancy. Where the state bureaucracy supporting
the bourgeoisie and the standing army does not dominate the state appa-
ratus completely (a rare case) or has been weakened, as in the case of the
monarchy and the Russian bourgeoisie at the time of the Bolshevik
Revolution in 1917, the working class might attain their goal of class
liberation by peaceful means; but in most cases, the notion that "the lever
of the revolution will have to be force" is harnessed by the masses and
unified by class consciousness and popular solidarity.6'
Based on their historical investigations, Marx and Engels understood
the role of violence as the midwife in the birth of a new social order
within the old framework of the nation-state. In his later years, Engels
speculated that with the changes in the ideological situation of the classes
in any national territory, "a real victory of an insurrection over the mili-
tary in street fighting is one of the rarest exceptions." 63 In an unusual
historic conjuncture, however, the Bolshevik revolution mobilized mass
strikes and thus disproved Engels. Nevertheless, Marx's "analytical uni-
versality," to use John Dunn's phrase, remains valid in deploying the
concept of totality to comprehend the nexus of state, class and nation.
6
We can rehearse here the issues that need to be examined from the view-
point of totality: Was Lenin's "dictatorship of the proletariat" an imposi-
tion of state violence, or the coercive rule of the people against the class
enemy? If it is an instrumental means of the new proletarian state, did it
implicate the nation? Is violence here both structured into the state sys-
tem of apparatuses and inscribed in the collective agency of the working
masses cognized as the nation? Is the political authority invoked by the
proletarian state embodied in the class interest of all those exploited by
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capital (in both periphery and center) ascendant over all? Marxists who
are critical of the Leninist interpretation denounce the use of state vio-
lence as an anarchist deviation, an arbitrary application of force.0 They
affirm instead the law-governed historical process that will inevitably
transform capitalism into socialism, whatever the subjective intentions of
the political protagonists involved.6 Such fatalism, however, rules out
the intervention of a class-for-itself freed from ideological blinders and
uniting all the oppressed with its moral-intellectual leadership, the cardi-
nal axiom of socialist revolution.
Rationalist thinkers for their part reject violence as an end in itself
while accepting the force of the market as normal and natural. This is
epitomized by legal thinkers who contend that primordial nationalist
claims should be regulated by autonomous international law, "the do-
main of the metajuridique."67 By identifying nationalism as a primitive
elemental force outside the jurisdiction of positive law, the modernist
legal scholar is alleged to be receptive to its experimental creativity so
that new legal techniques are devised to regulate the destabilization of
Europe-and for that matter, its colonial empires-by "separatist nation-
alisms." The aim is to pacify the subalterns and oppressed classes by
juridical and culturalist prophylactic.
As I have noted above in dealing with Fanon's work, the nature of
violence in the process of decolonization cannot be grasped by such
dualistic metaphysics epitomized in the binarism of passion-versus-law.
What is needed is the application of a historical materialist critique to the
complex problem of national self-determination. Marxists like Lenin and
Rosa Luxemburg, despite their differences, stress the combination of
knowledge and practice in analyzing the balance of political forces."
They contend that class struggle is a form of knowledge/action, the civil
war of political groups, which can synthesize wars of position (legal,
peaceful reforms) and the war of maneuver (organized frontal assault by
armed masses, to use Gramsci's terminology) in the transformation of
social relations in any particular nation. 69 Violence itself can become a
creative force insofar as it reveals the class bias of the bourgeois/colonial
state and serves to accelerate the emergence of class-consciousness and
organized popular solidarity. Insofar as the force of nation/national iden-
65. For a critique of voluntarism, see ANTONIO GRAMSCI, SELECnONS FROM THE PRISON
NOTEBOOKS 202-02 (1971); GEORG LUKACS, THE PROCESS OF DEMOCRATIZATION (1991).
66. This mechanistic or histroicist tendency may be discerned in JACK WODDIS, NEW
THEORIES OF REVOLUTION (1972); M. ROSENTHAL & P. YUDIN EDS., A DICTIONARY OF
PHILOSOPHY 391 (1967).
67. See generally Berman, supra note 6.
68. See, V. Lenin, Left-Wing Communism-an Infantile Disorder, in SELECTED WORKS OF
LENIN (1971); ROSA LUXEMBURG, THE MASS STRIKE, THE POLITICAL PARTY, AND THE TRADE
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69. See V. LENIN, MATERIALISM AND EMPIRIO-CRITICISM (1972); ROSA LUXEMBURG, THE
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tity distracts and prohibits the development of class-consciousness, it
becomes useless for socialist transformation. In colonized societies,
however, nationalism coincides with the converging class-consciousness
of workers, peasants, and the masses of subjugated natives that constitute
the political force par excellence in harnessing violence for emancipatory
goals.
From the historical-materialist perspective then, violence cannot be
identified with the nation or nation-state per se under all circumstances.
We need to distinguish between the two positions; the post-modem posi-
tion of indiscriminate attack on all totalities (such as class, nation, etc.)
premised on a syllogistic Kantian means-ends rationality, and the histori-
cal-materialist position where means/ends are dialectically calibrated in
historically inventive modalities, so as to illuminate the problem of vio-
lence in this new millennium. The impasse between these two positions
reflects the relation of unceasing antagonism between the bourgeoisie
and the nationalities they exploit in the world system of commodity-
exchange and accumulation.
On another level, the impasse may be viewed as a theoretical crux. It
signifies the antinomy between agency and structure, the intentionalist-
nominalist pragmatism of liberals, and the structuralist views of histori-
cal materialists. The former looks at the nation as always implicated in
the state, while the latter considers the nation as historically separate and
contingent on the vicissitudes of concrete class warfare. One way of try-
ing to elucidate this contradiction is by examining Walter Benjamin's
argument in Critique of Violence0 .
Taking Sorel as one point of departure, Benjamin considers the use
of violence as a means for establishing governance.7 Law is opposed to
divine violence grasped as fate and the providential reign of justice.
Bound up with violence, law is cognized as power, a power considered
as a means of establishing order within a national boundary. The aboli-
tion of state power is the aim of revolutionary violence, which operates
beyond the reach of law-making force, an aspiration for justice that
would spell the end of class society. Proletarian revolution resolves the
means-ends instrumentalism of bourgeois politics. Violence becomes
problematic when fate/justice, once deemed providential, eludes our
grasp with the Babel of differences blocking communication and also
aggrandizing particularisms found below the level of the nation-form and
its international, not to say cosmopolitan, possibilities.
Violence is only physical force divorced from its juridical potency.
Benjamin's thesis may be more unequivocal than the academically fash-
70. See generally Walter Benjamin, Critique of Violence, in REFUECrONS 277-300 (Edmund




ionable Foucauldian view of subsuming violence in power relations. It
takes a more scrupulous appraisal of the sectarian limitations as well as
empowering possibilities of violence in the context of class antagonisms.
While the issue of nationalist violence is not explicitly addressed in his
essay, Benjamin seeks to explore the function of violence as a creator
and preserver of law, a factor intricately involved in the substance of
normative processes. Benjamin writes: "Lawmaking is power making,
and, to that extent, an immediate manifestation of violence. Justice is the
principle of all divine end making, power the principle of all mythical
lawmaking." Lawmaking mythical violence can be contested only by
divine power, which today, according to Benjamin, is manifested in,
"educative power, which in its perfected form stands outside the law.""
Benjamin is not entirely clear about this "educative power," but I think it
can only designate the influence of the family and other agencies in civil
society not regulated by the traditional state apparatuses. In another
sense, Benjamin alludes to "the proper sphere of understanding, lan-
guage," which makes possible the peaceful resolution of conflicts. 4
Since language is intimately linked with the national community, na-
tional consciousness contradicts the disruptive effects of violence in its
capacity to resolve antagonisms.
Benjamin goes on to investigate violence embodied in the state (as
contradistinguished from the national community) through a process of
demystification. 5 His critique begins by disclosing the idea of its devel-
opment and its trajectory of ruptures and mutations, which in turn expose
the fact that all social contracts depend on a lie, or on fiction.76 "Justice,
the criterion of ends," supersedes legality, "the criterion of means." n
Justice is the reign of communication, which, because it excludes lying,
excludes violence. In effect, violence is the mediation that enables state
power to prevail. Violence cannot be eliminated by counter-violence that
simply inverts it. Only the educative power of language, communication
associated with the national collectivity, can do away with the need to
lie. But since the social contract displaces justice as the end of life with
legality connected with the state, and law is required as an instrument to
enforce the contract, violence continues to be a recurrent phenomenon in
a commodity-centered society.
Benjamin is silent about the nation and the efficacy of popular sover-
eignty in this text. His realism seeks to clarify the historic collusion be-
tween law, violence, and the state. 78 He wants to resolve the philosophi-
72. Id. at 295.
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cal dualism of means and ends that has bedeviled liberal rationalism and
its inheritors; pragmatism and assorted post-modernist nominalisms. His
realism strives to subordinate the instrumentality of violence to law, but
eventually he dismisses law as incapable of realizing justice. 79 But we
may ask: how can justice-the quest for identity without exclu-
sion/inclusion, without alterity-be achieved in history if it becomes
some kind of intervention by a transcendent power into the secular do-
main of class struggle? How can justice be attained as an ideal effect of
communication? Perhaps justice can be attained through language as
mediated in the nation-form, in the web of discourse configuring the na-
tion as a community of speakers, or as the performance of grou s unified
under the aegis of struggle against oppression and exploitation?
Benjamin's speculation on the reconciling charisma of language
seems utopian in the pejorative sense. Peoples speaking the same lan-
guage (e.g., Northern Ireland, Colombia, North and South Korea) con-
tinue to be locked in internecine conflict. If violence is inescapable in the
present milieu of reification and commodity-fetishism, how can we use it
to promote dialogue and enhance the resources of the oppressed for lib-
eration? In a seminal essay entitled Nationalism and Modernity, Charles
Taylor underscores the modernity of nationalism in opposition to those
who condemn it as atavistic tribalism or a regression to primordial barba-
rism." In the context of modernization, Taylor resituates violence in the
framework of the struggle for recognition-nationalism "as a call to dif-
ference . . . lived in the register of threatened dignity, and constructing a
new, categorical identity as the bearer of that dignity.
' 2
The philosophical underpinning of the struggle for recognition and
recovery of dignity needs to be stressed. This struggle clearly invokes the
Hegelian paradigm of the relation between lord and bondsman in The
Phenomenology of Mind. 3 In this struggle, the possibility of violence
mediates the individual's discovery of his finite and limited existence,
his vulnerability, and his need for community. Piotr Hoffman's gloss
underlines the Hegelian motif of freedom as risk: "Violence .. .is the
necessary condition of my emergence as a universal, communal being..
• for I can find common ground with the other only insofar as both of us
can endure the mortal danger of the struggle and can thus think inde-
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pendently of a blind attachment to our particular selves." Since the na-
tion evokes sacrifice (the warrior's death on the battlefield, honor, self-
transcendence, destiny) the capitalist state seeks to mobilize such nation-
centered feelings and emotions to legitimize itself as a wider, more inclu-
sive, and less artificial reality to attain its own accumulative goals. We-
ber reminds us: "For the state is the highest power organization on earth,
it has power over life and death. . .. A mistake comes in, however, when
one speaks of the state alone and not of the nation." '
The nationalist struggle for recognition and the violence of anti-
colonial revolutions thus acquire a substantial complexity in the context
of modernity, the fact of uneven development, and the vicissitudes of
capitalist crisis. In any case, whatever the moral puzzle entailed by the
plural genealogies of the nation-state, it is clear that a dogmatic pacifism
is no answer to an effective comprehension of the real world and pur-
poseful intervention in it. Given the continued existence of nation-states
amidst the increasing power of transnational corporations in a geopoliti-
cal arena of sharpening rivalry, can we choose between a "just" and an
"unjust" war when nuclear weapons that can destroy the whole planet are
involved? Violence on such a scale obviously requires the dialectical
transcendence of the system of nation-states in the interest of planetary
justice and survival.
Overall, the question of violence cannot be answered within the
framework of the Realpolitik of the past, but only within the framework
of nation-states living in mutual reciprocity. Causality, however, has to
be ascertained and responsibility assigned even if the nation is construed
as "an interpretive construct." My view is that the hegemonic bloc of
classes using the capitalist state machinery is the crux of the problem. If
nations have been manipulated by states dominated by posses-
sive/acquisitive classes that have undertaken and continue to undertake
colonial and imperial conquests, then the future of humanity and all liv-
ing organisms on earth can be insured only by eliminating those classes
that are the origin of state violence. The nation-form can then be recon-
stituted and transcended to insure that it will not generate reasons or op-
portunities for class-based state-violence to recur. That will be the chal-
lenge for future revolutionaries.
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